

MAXIM MASSENKOFF

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BUSINESS ADDRESS:

Department of Economics
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DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS:

PRIMARY

Behavioral economics
Labor economics
Applied econometrics

SECONDARY

Experimental economics

FIELDS OF CONCENTRATION:

Public finance, behavioral economics

DISSERTATION TITLE: Essays on parenthood, crime, and unemployment

Expected Date of Completion:	June 2020
Principal Advisor:	Professor Stefano Della Vigna
Other References:	Professors Jesse Rothstein and Christopher Walters

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

	DEGREE	DATE	FIELD
UC Santa Barbara	B.A.	2010	Economics

PAPERS:

- **Family formation and crime**, joint with Evan K. Rose (Job Market Paper)
While economists typically study the effects of punishments and taxes on crime and drug use, sociologists have long emphasized transformative "turning points" which strengthen social bonds and reduce deviant behavior. Using administrative data from Washington state, we perform a large-scale study of turning points, focusing on childbirth and marriage. Our event study analysis suggests that pregnancy is a strong inducement for fathers and especially mothers to reduce criminal behavior. For mothers, criminal offending drops precipitously in the first few months of pregnancy, stabilizing at half of pre-pregnancy levels three years after the birth. Men show a 25 percent decline beginning at the onset pregnancy; however, domestic violence arrests spike for fathers immediately after the birth. A design using stillbirths as counterfactuals suggests a causal role for children. In contrast, marriage marks the completion of a 50 percent decline in offending for both men and women. The data present a unique opportunity to test the implications of a dynamic rational addiction model, which suggests forward looking behavior among married and unmarried mothers.
- **Job search and unemployment insurance: New evidence from one million audits** (working paper)
I study unemployment insurance claimants using one million eligibility audits spanning 1987 to the present. The audits include a verified, one-time survey of active claimants giving their weekly benefit amount, reservation wage, targeted occupation, and number of job contacts made that week. Using a regression kink design, I find that monetary weekly benefits have a positive impact on unemployment duration. However, the same design finds no effects of unemployment benefits on any of the recorded search behaviors. Despite this null finding, the search behaviors respond to other factors in the expected ways: claimants later in their spells have a lower reservation wage, are more likely to be switching occupations, and make slightly more job contacts; also, claimants have lower reservation wages when the unemployment rate is higher. These results suggest that search behaviors may not explain the duration response to benefits.
- **The effects of strikes on firms and workers**, joint with Nathan Wilmers (working paper)
Labor strikes in the United States have declined precipitously since the 1980s. The increased use of strike replacement workers and an employer-friendly legal and regulatory environment has led some researchers to argue that strikes have lost their potency. We gather a series of novel microdata to test this claim, performing the first analysis connecting strikes, revenue, and employment at the establishment level. In an event study framework, we find that businesses experience a substantial 10 percent decline in revenue and employment after a strike, with the effects concentrated in the first two years following. These declines appear suddenly with strikes and are not anticipated by prior business problems. Data on collective bargaining agreements and person-level data from the CPS and SIPP suggest that the declines in revenue and employment do not stem from generous wage settlements or from pay or benefit increases for striking workers. Instead, strikes appear to drive business toward competitors. These findings suggest that strikes, when they do occur, are costly for both struck firms and striking workers.
- **Nudging UI compliance: a statewide experiment in Missouri**, joint with Andrew Johnston (data collection)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:**RESEARCH:**

Research Assistant, Department of Economics, U.C. Berkeley (2016-2019)

Analyzed experimental results and estimated structural model for Prof. Stefano DellaVigna

Analysis and data construction using administrative Danish data for Prof. Gabriel Zucman

TEACHING:

Teaching Assistant, Goldman School of Public Policy, U.C. Berkeley (Fall 2018)

Program evaluation

Teaching Assistant, Economics Department, Harvard (Spring 2014), MIT (Fall 2013)

Game theory and human behavior

PUBLICATIONS (pre-PhD):

“Kill or die: Moral judgment alters linguistic coding of causality”

With Julian De Freitas, Peter DeScioli, Jason Nemirow, and Steven Pinker, *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 2017

“Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money.”

With Peter DeScioli, Robert Kurzban, Alex Shaw, and Michael Bang Petersen, *Proceedings of the Royal Society B.*, 2014

“How universal is the Big Five? Testing the five-factor model of personality variation among forager–farmers in the Bolivian Amazon.”

With Michael Gurven, Chris von Rueden, Hillard Kaplan, and Marino Lero Vie, *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 104(2), 354. 2013

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

2014 University Fellowship, UC Berkeley

2014 Bok Prize for Teaching Excellence, Harvard University

OTHER INFORMATION:

Affiliations: American Economic Association

Citizenship: US